A push to `dev` now becomes a live demo, and a failed build never takes the
demo down.
- Four tables (pipeline_runs, pipeline_steps, releases, app_runtimes) and their
migration; alembic upgrade/downgrade/check all clean.
- DeliveryService implements DeliveryHooks: on_app_created provisions the demo
port + host + first build (idempotently); on_branch_pushed queues a run for
`dev` and supersedes older *queued* runs, leaving a running one alone.
- The 8-step pipeline. Blue/green is real: the replacement starts on a staging
port, is healthchecked, and only then does the route move — then the previous
container is stopped. A failure removes the replacement, releases its port and
leaves the old container serving.
- The demo port ledger is the DATABASE, not the router adapters' in-memory maps:
the API and the delivery worker are separate processes.
- Runs are claimed with a conditional UPDATE, so two workers never build the
same run.
- Live logs are batched (1 event / 500 ms, 200 lines) and redacted as a whole
tail — per-chunk redaction misses a secret split across pipe reads, and the
*stored* tail leaked until this was fixed.
- delivery worker: drain the queue, then poll remotes for pushes made outside
the engine.
- 7 routes; reads need membership, actions need projects.manage and are audited.
Tests: 415 API (+21, 1 docker-marked skipped); ruff, mypy, alembic check clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-3.md
The platform's side of D6: git runs on the host, in a gitdir that is never
mounted into a container, so repository credentials never reach the model.
- adapters/git_workspace.py: LocalGitWorkspaceAdapter implementing
RepoWorkspacePort. Bare shared gitdir + a dev work tree mounted at
/workspace + one linked worktree per task under work/.worktrees/<id>
(excluded via the gitdir's info/exclude, not the project's .gitignore).
Explicit --git-dir/--work-tree, core.hooksPath=/dev/null, fsmonitor off,
quotePath off, GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM, a private HOME per project, prompts off,
one asyncio.Lock per project. Token via GIT_ASKPASS reading a 0600 file; SSH
key as a 0600 temp file with a pinned known_hosts. Everything deleted in a
finally; only a *path* ever travels through the environment.
- The bug this phase existed to find: --git-dir=<shared> does not address a
linked worktree, so `git commit` in a task worktree committed straight to
`dev`. Operations now address <gitdir>/worktrees/<task_id> explicitly — and
never read the worktree's .git file, which a repository can rewrite.
- domain/platform/rules.py: is_blocked_address (pure) + assert_remote_host_allowed
(resolves, refuses if any address is loopback/private/link-local/metadata).
Shared by the git remote test and, later, every deploy target.
- ProjectExternalGit domain model + repository; container_delivery wires the
real adapter behind GIT_WORKSPACE=local with a resolver that joins the
project, its repo and its (decrypted) credentials.
Tests: 394 API (+48) against real git and a local bare repo; ruff and mypy clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-2.md
The execution boundary for v2. Adds the local docker/podman sandbox adapter
and the hardened host subprocess runner every other delivery adapter will use.
- adapters/process.py: the one place the platform shells out. argv-only (no
shell), start_new_session + killpg on timeout, concurrent stdout/stderr
drains with a byte cap, explicit minimal env (never os.environ), and a
missing binary reported as spawn_failed rather than an exception.
- adapters/docker_sandbox.py: DockerSandboxAdapter over SandboxProviderPort.
--user 1000:1000, --cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, pids/cpu/memory limits,
--read-only with tmpfs scratch, one bind mount (the work tree, never the git
dir), labels, no published ports. Path-safe file access; secrets refused in
`docker exec -e`. Extras for later phases: start_demo_container (loopback
publish only), list_managed_containers, remove_container.
- registry: SANDBOX_PROVIDER=docker, cached singleton so the workspace registry
survives create_workspace -> start_session.
- sandbox_gateway worker: reap_orphans() removes labelled containers no live
session points at, audited as sandbox.reap; run_pass() does both passes.
- sandbox router: every mutating route now requires the platform owner
(PLAN-v2 §7.7); read-only status routes stay open to org members.
- sandbox-panel: canManageInfra prop (fails closed) hides the create form,
the session panel and the action buttons from non-owners.
Tests: 346 API (+37), 67 web (+3); ruff, mypy, tsc and lint clean.
Three existing tests now drive the sandbox as the platform owner, since that
is who may touch it.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-1.md
mjalmoudy94