The user-visible payoff of the whole delivery workstream.
- (app)/app: four tabs — pipeline (runs + the eight steps + a live console),
releases (with demo rollback), production (target summary, confirmed deploy,
history), Git. The header answers "is it live": demo URL, live release,
health state.
- Live console: batches onto an animation frame, stops following the tail the
moment the user scrolls away from the bottom, strips ANSI colour codes and
carriage-return redraws. A console that yanks the view back is worse than none.
- Production panel: the target is shown as the operator recognises their server
plus has_secret/ثبت شده. No field anywhere could render a credential.
- contracts: the v2 delivery types and seven new WsEventType members.
- /admin/sandbox (owner): per-role container counts, running containers, per-org
limits, image mapping, stop with the id typed back (audited). A provider without
the capability reports an empty list rather than an error.
- /admin/domains (owner): every route with its owning app, attach/detach (host
typed back), idempotent re-sync.
- /projects removed entirely, with a permanent redirect to /app.
Tests: 502 API (+3), 78 web (+11); ruff, mypy, tsc and lint clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-6.md
The execution boundary for v2. Adds the local docker/podman sandbox adapter
and the hardened host subprocess runner every other delivery adapter will use.
- adapters/process.py: the one place the platform shells out. argv-only (no
shell), start_new_session + killpg on timeout, concurrent stdout/stderr
drains with a byte cap, explicit minimal env (never os.environ), and a
missing binary reported as spawn_failed rather than an exception.
- adapters/docker_sandbox.py: DockerSandboxAdapter over SandboxProviderPort.
--user 1000:1000, --cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, pids/cpu/memory limits,
--read-only with tmpfs scratch, one bind mount (the work tree, never the git
dir), labels, no published ports. Path-safe file access; secrets refused in
`docker exec -e`. Extras for later phases: start_demo_container (loopback
publish only), list_managed_containers, remove_container.
- registry: SANDBOX_PROVIDER=docker, cached singleton so the workspace registry
survives create_workspace -> start_session.
- sandbox_gateway worker: reap_orphans() removes labelled containers no live
session points at, audited as sandbox.reap; run_pass() does both passes.
- sandbox router: every mutating route now requires the platform owner
(PLAN-v2 §7.7); read-only status routes stay open to org members.
- sandbox-panel: canManageInfra prop (fails closed) hides the create form,
the session panel and the action buttons from non-owners.
Tests: 346 API (+37), 67 web (+3); ruff, mypy, tsc and lint clean.
Three existing tests now drive the sandbox as the platform owner, since that
is who may touch it.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-1.md
mjalmoudy94