Gap-closing on top of the merged A3-3..A3-6 work:
- ProjectService.create_preview_domain now refuses a label that is a reserved
platform name (git, mcp, api, panel, ...) via PROTECTED_HOST_LABELS. The rules
set existed but only the owner-facing validate_extra_host consulted it, so the
tenant path could reserve one.
- process.py: signal.SIGKILL is resolved through getattr with a SIGTERM
fallback, so the module imports and type-checks on Windows where SIGKILL does
not exist.
- Three more Windows test repairs: a git-created .git must be unlinked and
recreated rather than overwritten in place; POSIX-only chmod and symlink
assertions are gated on os.name (the security property they assert is checked
everywhere, the platform-specific mechanics only where they apply).
- docs/plan/reports/agent-3-final.md: the integration hand-off — host
requirements, every setting, every endpoint added or changed, the tables, the
open CHANGE REQUESTS, a 12-step manual QA script and the known limitations.
Checks: ruff clean, mypy clean (136 files), 521 API tests pass, 83 web tests
pass, tsc clean, next lint clean.
The user-visible payoff of the whole delivery workstream.
- (app)/app: four tabs — pipeline (runs + the eight steps + a live console),
releases (with demo rollback), production (target summary, confirmed deploy,
history), Git. The header answers "is it live": demo URL, live release,
health state.
- Live console: batches onto an animation frame, stops following the tail the
moment the user scrolls away from the bottom, strips ANSI colour codes and
carriage-return redraws. A console that yanks the view back is worse than none.
- Production panel: the target is shown as the operator recognises their server
plus has_secret/ثبت شده. No field anywhere could render a credential.
- contracts: the v2 delivery types and seven new WsEventType members.
- /admin/sandbox (owner): per-role container counts, running containers, per-org
limits, image mapping, stop with the id typed back (audited). A provider without
the capability reports an empty list rather than an error.
- /admin/domains (owner): every route with its owning app, attach/detach (host
typed back), idempotent re-sync.
- /projects removed entirely, with a permanent redirect to /app.
Tests: 502 API (+3), 78 web (+11); ruff, mypy, tsc and lint clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-6.md
The one path that touches a customer's server, and the one the platform cannot
undo. It is human-triggered, confirmed and audited; there is deliberately no
code path from a pipeline run into it (D13).
- deploy_ssh.py: SshDeployer. Release lands in releases/<ts>-<sha7>/, the
post-deploy command runs with cwd there, and only then does `current` move —
atomically (relative symlink + mv -T). A failed hook or extraction never moves
it, so the previous release keeps serving. Host key is pinned on first success
(TOFU); a mismatch is a hard failure. Prunes to the newest five.
- deploy_ftp.py: FtpDeployer. FTP has no atomic switch and no rollback except a
backup, so a backup is mandatory: every file about to be overwritten is
archived under ARTIFACTS_ROOT before anything is uploaded. The artifact is
extracted, then the build dir (dist/build/public/out) is chosen — a static
deploy must not publish the repository. Archive members are sanitised: absolute
paths, `..` and escaping links are refused.
- deploy_target.py: the tester that dispatches on `kind`.
- deploy_service.py + production_deploys (migration a3b4c5d6e7f4) + 4 routes.
One deploy per project at a time; the org slug must be typed back; the target
summary reports has_secret, never the secret.
Tests: 499 API (+26) with fake SSH/FTP transports; ruff, mypy, alembic clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-5.md
Domains are infrastructure, and in v2 infrastructure is the platform owner's
alone (D9). A tenant gets one automatic demo host and nothing else.
- admin_domains.py (owner-only): list every route with its owning app, attach an
extra host, detach with the host typed back as confirmation (audited), re-sync
the router from the database, and read the suggested MCP gateway route.
- domain/platform/rules.py: validate_extra_host. Two shapes only — a single
label under the managed root, or a full custom FQDN when ALLOW_CUSTOM_DOMAINS
is on. A wildcard is refused in both (it would match another tenant's
subdomain), and so are 30 protected platform labels (git, mcp, panel, api...).
Enforced in the router *and* again in the adapter.
- Both router adapters gained routes_fingerprint / list_all_routes /
sync_routes. Re-sync writes and reloads only when the rendered state differs:
a reload drops every in-flight connection on the host, including live demos.
Adapter-level extras, not additions to the frozen DomainRouterPort.
- The member-facing preview-domain routes are owner-only now. They are kept
because the demo host is still created through them at app-creation time.
Tests: 473 API (+58); ruff and mypy clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-4.md
A push to `dev` now becomes a live demo, and a failed build never takes the
demo down.
- Four tables (pipeline_runs, pipeline_steps, releases, app_runtimes) and their
migration; alembic upgrade/downgrade/check all clean.
- DeliveryService implements DeliveryHooks: on_app_created provisions the demo
port + host + first build (idempotently); on_branch_pushed queues a run for
`dev` and supersedes older *queued* runs, leaving a running one alone.
- The 8-step pipeline. Blue/green is real: the replacement starts on a staging
port, is healthchecked, and only then does the route move — then the previous
container is stopped. A failure removes the replacement, releases its port and
leaves the old container serving.
- The demo port ledger is the DATABASE, not the router adapters' in-memory maps:
the API and the delivery worker are separate processes.
- Runs are claimed with a conditional UPDATE, so two workers never build the
same run.
- Live logs are batched (1 event / 500 ms, 200 lines) and redacted as a whole
tail — per-chunk redaction misses a secret split across pipe reads, and the
*stored* tail leaked until this was fixed.
- delivery worker: drain the queue, then poll remotes for pushes made outside
the engine.
- 7 routes; reads need membership, actions need projects.manage and are audited.
Tests: 415 API (+21, 1 docker-marked skipped); ruff, mypy, alembic check clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-3.md
The platform's side of D6: git runs on the host, in a gitdir that is never
mounted into a container, so repository credentials never reach the model.
- adapters/git_workspace.py: LocalGitWorkspaceAdapter implementing
RepoWorkspacePort. Bare shared gitdir + a dev work tree mounted at
/workspace + one linked worktree per task under work/.worktrees/<id>
(excluded via the gitdir's info/exclude, not the project's .gitignore).
Explicit --git-dir/--work-tree, core.hooksPath=/dev/null, fsmonitor off,
quotePath off, GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM, a private HOME per project, prompts off,
one asyncio.Lock per project. Token via GIT_ASKPASS reading a 0600 file; SSH
key as a 0600 temp file with a pinned known_hosts. Everything deleted in a
finally; only a *path* ever travels through the environment.
- The bug this phase existed to find: --git-dir=<shared> does not address a
linked worktree, so `git commit` in a task worktree committed straight to
`dev`. Operations now address <gitdir>/worktrees/<task_id> explicitly — and
never read the worktree's .git file, which a repository can rewrite.
- domain/platform/rules.py: is_blocked_address (pure) + assert_remote_host_allowed
(resolves, refuses if any address is loopback/private/link-local/metadata).
Shared by the git remote test and, later, every deploy target.
- ProjectExternalGit domain model + repository; container_delivery wires the
real adapter behind GIT_WORKSPACE=local with a resolver that joins the
project, its repo and its (decrypted) credentials.
Tests: 394 API (+48) against real git and a local bare repo; ruff and mypy clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-2.md
The execution boundary for v2. Adds the local docker/podman sandbox adapter
and the hardened host subprocess runner every other delivery adapter will use.
- adapters/process.py: the one place the platform shells out. argv-only (no
shell), start_new_session + killpg on timeout, concurrent stdout/stderr
drains with a byte cap, explicit minimal env (never os.environ), and a
missing binary reported as spawn_failed rather than an exception.
- adapters/docker_sandbox.py: DockerSandboxAdapter over SandboxProviderPort.
--user 1000:1000, --cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, pids/cpu/memory limits,
--read-only with tmpfs scratch, one bind mount (the work tree, never the git
dir), labels, no published ports. Path-safe file access; secrets refused in
`docker exec -e`. Extras for later phases: start_demo_container (loopback
publish only), list_managed_containers, remove_container.
- registry: SANDBOX_PROVIDER=docker, cached singleton so the workspace registry
survives create_workspace -> start_session.
- sandbox_gateway worker: reap_orphans() removes labelled containers no live
session points at, audited as sandbox.reap; run_pass() does both passes.
- sandbox router: every mutating route now requires the platform owner
(PLAN-v2 §7.7); read-only status routes stay open to org members.
- sandbox-panel: canManageInfra prop (fails closed) hides the create form,
the session panel and the action buttons from non-owners.
Tests: 346 API (+37), 67 web (+3); ruff, mypy, tsc and lint clean.
Three existing tests now drive the sandbox as the platform owner, since that
is who may touch it.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-1.md
- users.is_platform_owner → users.platform_role (owner|manager|user) با مهاجرت
d4e5f6a7b8c9 و backfill. ایندکس یکتای جزئی uq_single_platform_owner تضمین
میکند دقیقاً یک مالک وجود داشته باشد — در سطح دیتابیس، نه فقط در کد.
- ثبتنام عمومی حذف شد (POST /auth/signup). حسابها فقط با POST /admin/users
(فقط مالک، با رمز موقت یکبارمصرف) یا با پذیرش لینک دعوت ساخته میشوند.
در مسیر دعوت، اگر حساب وجود نداشته باشد خودِ دعوتشده رمز تعیین میکند؛ اگر
وجود داشته باشد لینک هرگز جای reset رمز را نمیگیرد.
- ساخت سازمان فقط برای مالک و مدیران؛ کاربر عادی با دعوت عضو میشود.
- تنزل یا حذف مدیر، سازمانهایش را به مالک سامانه منتقل میکند (مالکیت + عضویت،
با audit). حساب مالک از API تغییرناپذیر است؛ جابهجایی صندلی فقط با
POST /admin/transfer-ownership و در یک تراکنش انجام میشود.
- افزودن POST /auth/change-password برای تبدیل رمز موقت به رمز خصوصی.
- فرانت: صفحهٔ /admin/users، صفحهٔ /account، بازنویسی /accept-invite، حذف /signup،
گارد /onboarding برای کاربر عادی، و نشان نقش پلتفرم در پوستهٔ اپ.
- PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON برای SQLite تا ON DELETE CASCADE در dev و prod یکسان
رفتار کند (پیشتر حذف کاربر، عضویتهایش را یتیم میگذاشت).
- تست: ۳۰۰ تست بکاند (شامل tests/test_platform_hierarchy.py با ۲۲ تست) و ۶۴ تست
فرانتاند؛ ruff، mypy، tsc، eslint و build تمیز.
نام نمایشی و هویت اپلیکیشن در همهٔ سطوح کاربر-پسند از «AGY Web» به
«Smart Organization» تغییر کرد:
- UI: عنوان تب مرورگر، صفحهٔ ورود، برند و لوگوی پوستهٔ اپ (AG → SO)
- بکاند: مقدار پیشفرض app_name، نام و توضیح توزیع پایتون
- مانیفستها: package.json ریشه و چهار پکیج، pyproject.toml
- مستندات: README، PLAN، TODO و دو سند docs
شناسههای داخلی عمداً دستنخورده ماندهاند: scope پکیجهای @agy/*،
کلیدهای localStorage، نامهای logger، نام فایل پایگاهٔ داده، و اطلاعات
اتصال پایگاه داده در .env.example و infra/docker/docker-compose.yml.
مخزن اختصاصی برنامهٔ وب؛ محتوای پوشهٔ web در ریشهٔ مخزن قرار گرفت.
تاریخچهٔ پروژهٔ ربات (agy-bot) در این مخزن وجود ندارد و هیچ وابستگی runtime به آن نیست.
Agent 3